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Miran Bozovic. An Utterly Dark Spot: Gaze and Body in Early Modern
Philosophy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.
Miran Bozovic’s imaginative but uneven book poses a challenge to
this reviewer. In part, some of the disorientation may be attributed to my
own disciplinary affiliations, since the “early modern” in the book’s title
aligns with the norm in philosophy (and not the period so designated in
literary studies). For Bozovic, the term designates, more or less, a line
from Descartes to Bentham, one that encounters Leibniz, Spinoza,
Hume, and a great deal of Descartes’ contemporary, Malebranche, along
the way (all interpreted through the lens of Lacan). The not-registering of
its post-Cartesian emphasis coalesces with the suppression of another term
from the book’s title: God. Indeed, to the extent that one can reconstruct
a central thematic tying the various chapters together—and the book does
not lend itself easily to such a task—this would seem to be the question of
thanking God, especially for a world in which he is dead. (Perhaps Bozovic
here extends, in another context, his earlier work, Der Grosse Andere: Gotteskonzepte in der Philosophie der Neuzeit.) The book stages the different
ways in which post-Cartesian philosophy engages/projects the perversity
of a deus absconditus—read here as the locus of radical alterity—to conclude by suggesting the paradoxical necessity of a form of theism: the need
to believe in God precisely because he does not exist.
If Bozovic’s rather slim preface provides little by way of overall guidance, the opening chapter at least takes us fairly directly to what I take to
be the book’s central concern. “The case of the unmanly Scythians” allows
Bozovic to examine the patterns of inference whereby human beings relate
themselves to the idea of divine action or intervention. A treatise in the
Hippocratic Corpus tries to explain, we are told, the prevalence of impotence among only those Scythians who were pious and well-to-do, a phenomenon which led the afflicted to see the disease as a divine visitation.
However, recourse to the incomprehensibility of divine purpose was
blocked here because divine action appeared not indiscriminate but in fact
guided by rules. The difficulties attendant upon seeing God in anthropomorphic terms (in particular, by attributing human purposiveness to
ostensibly divine actions such as earthquakes and other natural disasters)
becomes evident in the oddly lawful deviation from the “normal” that
besets the Scythians. This failure of the usual teleological explanation leads
to the conception of a “perverse” God, who punishes human beings precisely for worshipping him in a way that expects Him to return divine favor
for human piety. To such a deviation, there are, Bozovic suggests, two
responses. Either, like the Scythians, one internalizes divine “perversity”
by becoming a “transvestite.” Or, as in Humean philosophical theism, one
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treats God as radically other, in which case He becomes a “transvestite,”
dressing up as a favorable, compassionate, indulgent, or offended deity.
The converse of divine perversity, the succeeding chapter (“A Brief
History of Insects”) implies, is the perversity of “life” and “body.” The
thought experiment here involves the Leibnizian insistence that there is no
birth or death “in the strict sense” (20) because all we have are transformations or metamorphoses of a persistent living body and its inseparable
soul. While Bozovic accepts Leibniz’s demonstration that there is no “first
birth” (after the creation ex nihilo), he takes it upon himself to compensate
for Leibniz’s failure to provide an example of a living body that “survives”
its own death. Bozovic imagines a “reversed life cycle” in which death precedes life—and indeed cites a species of mite as support: “the male copulates with its sisters within its mother’s shell and dies before birth” (22). It
remains unclear what exactly this case proves, since the problem would
seem to result largely from a linguistic game, a slippage between death or
birth taken “in the strict sense” and the everyday or “normal” sense of the
words. And a verbal shift seems constitutive of the argument regarding the
Scythians as well. In that case, Bozovic slides from a description wherein
impotence afflicts only the pious to the larger claim that it affects “every
pious Scythian, without exception” (10, emphasis added). Clearly, the kind
of “law” governing deviation would be different in these two cases, and
thus the kinds of explanations they demand would also need to be different. But because the philosophical problem—and, consequently, its “perverse” solution—requires the additional assumption of universality, such
an enlargement becomes necessary.
On one level, these are no doubt quibbles, since the specific instances
dealt with in this book, instead of being illuminated in their own right,
largely function to stage certain problems or to provide the material for
what one could call “thought experiments” concerning the consequences
of particular philosophical stances. The importance to the book of a figure
as minor as Malebranche thus derives in part from his extreme and unwavering adherence to a form of Cartesian theism. (Such nearly exclusive
focus on the immanent logic of a particular view of the world might also
account for the absence of any explicit consideration of gender in a book
that repeatedly invokes cases crying out for such a treatment: the so-called
“transvestites” —both the “Scythians” and the serial killer of The Silence of
the Lambs—in the opening chapter; the coquette of Marivaux’s La Vie de
Marianne in the extended reading of Spinoza; the “unintentional erection
of the male organ” as crucial disobedience of the body in Malebranche;
the disturbing “explanation” for Althusser’s murder of his wife in the
book’s conclusion.) But on another level, despite my general willingness
to join in the cogitational games, the book does not succeed in conveying
to me why these games are worth playing. Even if—to paraphrase Witt-
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genstein somewhat baldly—all philosophical problems are, at root, problems of language, one nonetheless needs to feel a sense of being
inextricably caught in the game for the problems to register as problems.
In fact, Slavoj Zizek’s playful and pithy foreword seems designed to provide just such a rationale: given the extent to which the Cartesian cogito
“serves as the foundation of our post-traditional society,” the book’s significance lies in its focus “on the fate of the body in … [the Cartesian]
reduction of the human being to abstract subject” (v). But in suggesting
an urgency that Bozovic’s book itself never quite addresses, Zizek’s foreword paradoxically draws attention precisely to the absence of a reflection
on what is at stake in the various paradoxes the book analyzes, the various
language games it initiates.
An Utterly Dark Spot undoubtedly also has its strengths. While it is
difficult to pin down the significance of the chapter on Spinoza’s Ethics
within the book as a whole, Bozovic nonetheless offers a stimulating and
careful reading of how Spinoza anticipates the particular coordination of
Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real effected in Lacanian psychoanalysis. As he
plausibly demonstrates, in Spinoza, as in Lacan, the emergence of “love”
calls for the symbolic “resolution” of a dyadic imaginary fixation, which
occurs via a real trigger, that is, an “accidental, partial feature” (33) that
takes the place of a constitutive absence or loss.
And there is a delight in paradoxical play that often charms and
intrigues. The concluding chapter on Bentham’s panopticon writings—
which lend the book its title—offers an original and intriguing interpretation that shifts emphasis from the now de rigeur Foucauldian account of
the emergence of the modern subject (through disciplining mechanisms)
to how Bentham centrally engages the dependence of “reality” upon “fictitious entities” for its “logical-discursive consistency” (102). Relating the
panopticon writings to Bentham’s peculiar brand of utilitarianism, Bozovic shows that the panopticon’s internal structure is that of a spectacle, or
a stage effect, aimed at “achieving the greatest effect of the punishment on
others [that is, society at large] with the least inflicted pain [on the prisoners themselves]” (99). This end involves the “fiction of punishment,” an
appearance that functions successfully precisely because “reality itself is
already structured like a fiction.” There is thus a critical distinction (and
parallel) to be made between the role of fiction in the panopticon (to deter
the prisoners from transgressing) and the deterring role of fiction for the
innocents outside the prison. Focusing on the role of the inspector in the
panopticon’s central tower rather than on the prisoners in the cells, Bozovic further shows that it is the very absence of the inspector that sustains
his (fictional) omnipresence for the prisoners; he thereby effectively takes
up the place of God, who exists only insofar as we (the prisoners) imagine
Him (the inspector) looking at us. God (or the inspector) is thus “an
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imaginary non-entity” without which, however, the “universe” (the panopticon) “would collapse” (116). In turn, the fear of—or, by extension,
the belief in—God paradoxically rests upon the very fact of his fictionality
or nonexistence: for fear is the “intrusion of something radically other,
something unknown into our world. And it is from this fear that we would
escape,” if we could be sure that God really existed, or at least we would
fear him in the way we fear “all the real entities we…designate as maleficent, like, for example, vicious dogs” (117). That God is dead, in other
words, solves nothing, for it was precisely his nonexistence that had always
structured the world. The only way to “escape” the rule of this present
absence would be to endow it with the one feature it does not possess:
existence. By making God’s dubious presence the focus of his book, Bozovic refuses us too easy an escape, leaving us to ponder instead the prisonhouse of the human mind.
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Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, ed. The Postcolonial Middle Ages. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2000. 286 pp. ISBN 0312219296.
In The Postcolonial Middle Ages, the editor Jeffrey Cohen has organized a compelling volume of essays that discusses the Middle Ages in
light of the critical paradigm of postcolonialism. What this volume sets out
to accomplish is not only an application of current theory to a historical
period, but rather as Cohen writes in his introduction, an attempt to interrogate postcolonial theory’s inability to confront its own postcolonial tendencies towards the Middle Ages. In particular, the inefficacy of
postcolonial studies to confront the problem of time where the Middle
Ages is often seen as just an abyss, one usually referred to only in considering the mythic origins of contemporary history or in constructing
“modern” history. However, Cohen does believe that even though “time
itself becomes a problem for postcolonial studies,” he thinks that “the
medieval ‘meridian’ or ‘middle’” can become a useful tool in rethinking
what postcolonial might signify (3). In essence, he writes that this work
has a dual agenda:
Janus-faced, biformis, the postcolonial Middle Ages performs a
double work, so that the alliance of postcolonial theory and medieval studies might open up the present to multiciplicity, newness,
difficult similarity conjoined to complex difference.(8)

